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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to shed some light on the usefulness of a contact tracing smartphone app for the containment
of the COVID-19 pandemic. We review the basics of contact tracing during the spread of a virus, we contextualize
the numbers to the case of COVID-19 and we analyse the state of the art for proximity detection using Bluetooth Low
Energy. Our contribution is to assess if there are scientific evidences that suggest a contact tracing app, using present
technologies, could be effective to slow down the spread of the virus. Our conclusion is that such evidences are lacking,
and we should re-think the introduction of such a privacy-invasive measure.
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1. Introduction
During the recent pandemic of the coronavirus infec-
tious disease 2019 (COVID-19) national governments im-
posed various flavors of “lockdown” forcing people in their
houses and preventing many of them to work, with the goal
of slowing down the pandemic and make it more manage-
able by national health systems. Such measures are un-
precedented as they limit personal freedom and strongly
impact national economies and need to be maintained only
for the shortest time required to stop the emergency. When
the emergency is tamed, governments introduce a so-called
“phase 2” which imposes milder limitations that can pro-
gressively help economies recover. Yet, being the first time
in modern history that our society faces such a threat, we
don’t have a clear path to follow for the phase 2. On
the one hand there is a widespread interest in removing
personal limitations, on the other, the risk of provoking
a second wave of spread of the virus will be present un-
til a vaccine or a cure are found and made available to
everybody.
One of the measures that has been considered by many
governments, and implemented by some, is the introduc-
tion of a mobile phone application that performs contact
tracing, e.g., it provides a list of contacts that took place
between couples of people. The app enables a person that
was tested positive to Sars-CoV2 (the aetiological agent
of COVID-19) to send a warning to all those that he/she
was in contact with in a certain time span. Those who
receive the warning will presumably act accordingly (iso-
lating themselves, or asking to be tested) and this is imag-
ined to contribute to keep the diffusion of the virus under
control.
In a few weeks the interest for this application sky-
rocketed, Google and Apple produced a dedicated API
to support contact tracing, the European Union provided
guidelines to specify the privacy implication of such appli-
cations and a consortium of companies started to elaborate
proposals. The public debate rightly focused on the pri-
vacy aspects, which are of paramount importance because
this is, in essence, the first ever mass-scale contact tracing
action promoted by democratic states. The privacy fallout
caused by the extensive use of such an app may be ex-
tremely dangerous and are hard to estimate and forecast
[1], if our society takes such a high risk, we must expect a
greater collective payoff.
Unfortunately, little importance has been given to the
fact that this application may be actually effective in its
goal, that is, limit the diffusion of the virus. In this pa-
per we take a first principle approach, and review the re-
search literature to understand if the technical means that
we have today may correctly perform contact tracing as
needed to stop the pandemic. If this is not true, then the
whole debate about the privacy implications may simply
loose its ground.
In our analysis we were not able to find any strong
evidence that a privacy preserving app based on current
technologies can achieve the stated goal, which should lead
to rethinking from scratch the adoption of a contact trac-
ing application. We observe that with current technolo-
gies a similar app could be used to perform a mild risk
assessment, but that this approach needs more technical
discussion and social acceptance.
In the rest of the paper we discuss what is needed to
slow down COVID-19 (section 2), and what are the privacy
and technical constraints we have to respect for the app
to be effective in a short time (sections 3 and 4). We
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then review the experiments carried out in the literature in
similar realistic conditions (section 5). All these elements
constitute the basis for a grounded discussion on the use
of a contact tracing app (sections 6 and 7).
2. Monitoring the Contagion
The reproduction number R expresses the expected
number of people infected by one single individual at a
certain stage of the epidemic. It is a key parameter to es-
timate the speed of the contagion and depends on a num-
ber of factors, including the way the virus is transmitted
but also the contention measures that are enforced. The
higher is the value of R, the faster the virus will spread.
The goal of contention measures is to lower R below 1,
so that the total number of infected people decreases with
time. The base reproduction number R0 is the value of R
at the beginning of the contagion, when all the population
is susceptible of being infected and no contention measures
are in place, thus, it generally holds that R ≤ R0.
The transmission of Sars-CoV2 primarily happens due
to respiratory droplets [2, 3], therefore reducing the num-
ber of infection-producing contacts that an infected person
incurs into is a key factor to slow the contagion. This is
obtained with social distancing, hygiene measures and iso-
lation of infected people. It is intuitive that the earliest
in time an infected person is isolated, the lower are the
chances to have contacts, the lower R will be overall. The
rationale for using a contact tracing app is straightforward,
when a person is tested positive, we need to quickly iden-
tify those that were infected by this person so that we can
isolate them as well. For COVID-19 there are evidences
that the transmission could occur also from asymptomatic
and pre-symptomatic people [4], which makes it even more
urgent to quickly isolate the close contacts of a person that
was tested positive.
There are estimates of the value of R0 using data that
refer to initial phases of the outbreak when no contention
measures where in place and all the population was sus-
ceptible. One of the first attempts to estimate R0 was per-
formed observing the passengers of the Diamond Princess
cruise ship [5] and reports a median value of R0 = 2.28
with a distribution that never exceeds 3. A similar num-
ber (between 2-3) is confirmed also by the analysis of the
initial phases of outbreak in China [6]. When contention
measures are put in place R is expected to decrease, for
instance at the time of writing the value of R in Germany
is estimated to be lower than 1 [7], as well as in Italy in
the period between April 19th and may 7th [8].
Of course the average or median estimated value of R
may not be representative of some extreme cases, the pres-
ence of super-spreaders has been reported for COVID-19
[9] with individuals possibly infecting up to 10 other peo-
ple in a single event. Yet, this kind of event is likely at
the early stage of the epidemic but can be controlled with
contention measures that have a limited impact on per-
sonal freedom: maintaining interpersonal distance, using
face masks and hygiene measures, and forbidding large in-
person meetings. In the phase 2, these measures must be
already in place. So the overall effect of super-spreaders
should become marginal.
2.1. The Secondary Attack Rate and the Contact Type
Another element that is relevant for our analysis is the
so-called secondary attack rate, that is, the percentage of
people that is actually infected among the contacts of a
person that has been tested positive to Sars-CoV2. The
secondary attack rate can be further specified defining it
for different contacts types (family, workplace etc. . . . ). In
the early stages of the outbreak of the virus in China (Jan
14th - Feb 15th, 2020) a group of people tested positive
were observed together with 1286 people among their con-
tacts [10]. Contacts were identified as “those who lived in
the same apartment, shared a meal, travelled, or socially
interacted with an index case” and excluded “contacts (eg,
other clinic patients) and some close contacts (eg, nurses)
who wore a mask during exposure were not included in this
group.”. Among the contacts, the large majority of those
that tested positive (77 over a total of 81 positives) were
households of the infected person. The secondary attack
rate restricted to households was estimated to be 11.2%.
A similar statistics related to the advanced phases of
the contagion comes from the Istituto Superiore per la
Sanit (ISS, the main center for research, control and tech-
nical scientific advice on public health in Italy) which pro-
vides weekly updates on the evolution of the Italian situa-
tion. The report dealing with the month April 7th - May
7th [8] includes the distribution of the contact places for
more than 9,360 cases for which this information is avail-
able1. Table 1 summarises the data and shows several
issues, the first is that in Italy 58% of the new infections
in that week happened in retirement homes. This is due
to the specific way the emergency has been managed in
Italy, which made retirement homes a focus of infection.
Albeit this happened in other nations, it can not be fully
generalized. For this reason in the last two columns of the
table we report the distribution of cases excluding the first
line. We can see that about 87% (70% excluding retire-
ment houses) of the cases happen in extremely predictable
locations: 18% (44%) in the family, 8% (21%) in hospitals,
and 2.4% (5.9%) in workplaces. Only 10% (25%) of the
cases happen somewhere else.
2.2. The Needle in the Haystack
Previous sections exposed data that are generally over-
looked when discussing about contact tracing applications:
i) every infected person infects in average between 2 and
3 people in the early stage of the epidemic, a number that
decreases when contention measures are applied during the
1In Italy the contention measures have been adopted with three
steps of increasing intensity in March 1st, 9th and 22nd, were reduced
starting May 4th and were still in place in the considered period.
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Location Number of infected Percent Cumulative Percent w/o RH Cumulative w/o RH
Retirement home (RH) 5,468 58.4 58.4 - -
Family 1,712 18.3 76.7 44 44
Hospital/clinic 816 8.7 85.4 21 65
Workplace 228 2.4 87.9 5.9 70.8
Boat/Cruise 83 0.9 88.8 2.1 72.9
Religious Community 64 0.7 89.4 1.6 74.6
Other 989 10.6 100 25.4 100
Table 1: The location of contagions in Italy, April 7th - May 7th. Column 5 and 6 report the same data excluding the numbers related to
Retirement homes.
outbreak; ii) the large majority of the infections involves
extremely predictable groups of people, family members
and work mates which can be identified with very basic
means, i.e. with manual contact tracing among house-
holds and work mates. If we consider a pessimistic value
R = 2 for the phase 2, and we assume that 30% of the in-
fected people can not be traced with manual contact trac-
ing, then we are left with an average value of slightly less
than 1 non-identified infected contact per 3 infected peo-
ple. The contact tracing application, to be useful, should
be able to identify this person.
This does not automatically rule out digital contact
tracing as we know that fast tracing can be key to slow
down the contagion in its initial phase or in a second up-
surge of the epidemic. Yet, data show that we need fine-
grained contact identification which in turn raises the ex-
pectations on the required performance of digital contact
tracing.
3. Contact Tracing with Mobile Phones: Motiva-
tions and Privacy Guidelines
Contact tracing refers to identifying “close contacts”,
a term that is specifically defined for a certain virus. For
COVID-19 the World Health Organization defines a “close
contact” as “Any person who had contact (within 1 metre)
with a confirmed case during their symptomatic period, in-
cluding 4 days before symptom onset”2. This definition
leaves room for interpretation because the duration of the
period is uncertain and does not take into consideration
prevention measures that could be adopted (such as face
masks). Several national health systems provide a more
specific version, the ones we were able to review gener-
ally consider close contact as being at short distance (less
than 2 meters) with an infected person for more than 15
minutes (see Appendix A.1).
Mobile phones can not be used for contact tracing, but
can be used for “proximity detection”, which means, in a
nutshell, identifying couples of devices that have been in
communication range with each other in a period of time.
2See https://www.who.int/publications-detail/the-first-few-x-(ffx)-cases-and-contact-investigation-protocol-for-2019-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)-infection
The discussion on contact tracing apps start from the as-
sumption that proximity detection is considered a good
approximation of contact tracing. One of the works that
is often mentioned in support of a contact tracing applica-
tion is from Ferretti et al. [11]. Ferretti et. al model the
outbreak of COVID-19 using the state of the art data on
its diffusion and show that considering the specific charac-
teristics of COVID-19, a fast contact tracing can be ben-
eficial to lower the value of R below 1. The authors do
not enter into the details of how such an application may
work, they just treat it as a factor that can speed up the
detection of new infected people. In this sense, it quite
straightforward that any factor that can make detection
faster will reduce R, and the paper provides a quantita-
tive analysis of this reduction using the efficacy of contact
tracing as one of the parameters of the model. They show
that with realistic timing (one day passing from detection
of infection to isolation and quarantine of contacts, and
100% success in isolating detected cases) to achieve R < 1
we need a contact tracing efficacy between 50% and 60%.
Note that this is a number that cumulatively includes all
contact tracing actions, including the presence of a mobile
phone application.
On this basis, several governments started to express
interest on the adoption of such an app, which of course
initiated a debate on its privacy implications. To set the
stage for such apps the European Union defined guidelines
for Privacy-Preserving contact tracing apps. These guide-
lines must be respected for apps to be acceptable under a
privacy point of view. At the same time, Apple and Google
provided the design for an API to perform proximity detec-
tion on their operating systems. Since we can not derogate
on the privacy guidelines, the open question is: do we have
enough evidences suggesting that the proposed proximity
detection solution can achieve the necessary accuracy in
contact tracing while respecting the privacy guidelines?
To answer this question we need to review some of the
technical guidelines provided by the EU.
3.1. Contact Tracing: the EU Privacy Technical Guide-
lines
Contact tracing is a privacy-intrusive operation. The
people that we meet every day and the duration of the
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encounters are extremely sensitive information. As soon
as the debate on contact tracing applications emerged, the
European Union published guidelines on the use of contact
tracing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic [12].
These guidelines should be interpreted as technical func-
tional requirements to be considered by the implementer
of the contact tracing app.
Among the many guidelines, some of the points that
are relevant for our analysis can be summarized as fol-
lows (Appendix A.2 reports excepts from the mentioned
document that expand the bullet points):
• Contact tracing must be based on voluntary adop-
tion, there should be no consequences for those that
opt out
• Phone location should not be used, only proximity
data should be used
• It should not be possible to track back the identity
of a person using the data from the app. This is
a crucial point, when Alice receives the notification
that she was in contact with an infected person, she
should not be able to say if this person is Bob3.
• Information should not exit the user phone if not
absolutely necessary.
These guidelines go in the direction of retaining the
least information possible, and maintaining it in the user
device.
Another extremely important guideline states the im-
portance of false positives. People that are diagnosed with
COVID-19 will be subject to isolation and thus decisions
can not be taken with an automated mechanism [1]. Be-
yond personal consequences we add that false positives
may have two side effects that can make the app useless,
or even harmful. If the rate of false positives is too high,
people that receive alerts will simply start to ignore them,
thus defeating the goal of the app itself. If instead peo-
ple do not underestimate the alerts and receive many false
positives, huge testing capacity, large enough medical staff
to perform the tests, and efficient logistic to avoid risk of
transmission in the hospital setting will be required. All
these resources are scarce during the upsurge of an epi-
demic and can not be wasted due to the inaccuracy of
contact tracing.
The sensitiveness to false positives calls for a fine-grained
alert system. Users should receive alerts when there is a
concrete risk of being infect, which requires a non trivial
analysis of the data. This stands at odds with the guide-
lines that, instead, recommend to limit the collection of
information and to avoid the concentration of information,
which is normally a requisite to perform inference on large
and complex data sets as we will see in the works described
in section 5.
3We use the widespread cryptography jargon describing two users
of the app as Alice and Bob and the server that is their intermediary
as Eve.
4. Proximity Detection with Bluetooth Low En-
ergy (BLE)
BLE is a natural candidate to perform proximity de-
tection between pairs of mobile phones. It is a well estab-
lished technology, introduced in 2010 and currently part
of the core Bluetooth specification4. There are no publicly
available statistics for the market uptake of BLE in active
devices at the time of writing. According to Katevas et
al. [13] BLE is present in almost all the existing iPhones,
and the Bluetooth SIG estimates that in 2024 100% of new
devices will be equipped with BLE5. Support for BLE is
available in Android since version 4.3 (2013) and in iOS
since version 5 (2011), so it’s reasonable to assume that
a very large portion of the mobile phones on the market
support BLE.
Proximity sensing can be performed with BLE with a
simple mechanism. Each BLE-equipped device can be in
two states, the broadcaster or the observer. The broad-
caster sends a broadcast beacon message on three default
channels every “Advertising Interval”, the observer instead
every “Scan Interval” wakes up and listens to beacons for
a “Scan Window” time. When the observer receives the
beacon it estimates the distance from the broadcaster us-
ing the Received Signal Strength (RSS). Since descriptions
of BLE can be easily found in the literature [14], we focus
only on the description of the solution that Google and
Apple provided to perform Contact Tracing using BLE.
4.1. Google/Apple Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing
In April 2020 Apple and Google released a joint docu-
ment with the technical specifications of a Privacy-Preserving
Contact Tracing API supported by their operating systsms6
based on BLE (PPCT, for short). PPCT offers a trade-
off between energy consumption, user privacy, and efficacy
and it is supposed to become the layer on which every other
contact tracing application may be based on. Nothing pre-
vents developers to use other technologies, but considering
the large diversity of devices and OS versions in the mar-
ket it is unlikely that any custom solution may reach the
needed uptake to be effective.
In PPCT phones act both as a broadcaster and as an
observer. The Advertising Interval is set between 200 and
270 ms (corresponding to approximately 4Hz), while the
Scan Interval is not specified, it should “have sufficient
coverage to discover nearby Exposure Notification Service
advertisements within 5 minutes [. . . ] with minimum pe-
riodic sampling every 5 minutes”. The Scan Window is
not specified at all. PPCT defines for each device a Tem-
porary Exposure Key (TEK), which is changed once per
day. This key is kept in Alice’s phone and never leaves
it if Alice does not get infected. Every ten minutes this
4See https://www.bluetooth.com/blog/bluetooth-low-energy-it-starts-with-advertising/.
5See https://www.bluetooth.com/bluetooth-resources/2020-bmu/.
6Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, see
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/.
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key is used together with a counter ranging from 0 to 144
to generate another key, the Rolling Proximity Identifier
(RPI). The RPI is included in the beacon (together with
some meta information that are not relevant for this dis-
cussion). Alice’s phone is thus identified by the same RPI
for 10 minutes, which will give Bob the chance of observ-
ing the beacon at least twice. Bob stores all the RPI he
receives in his device.
If Alice at some point becomes infected she uploads all
the TEK for the last 14 days (or any other value decided
by the application) to a Diagnosis Server (Eve), that is run
by the service provider (not Apple or Google necessarily
but the developer of the app). Eve periodically aggregates
the keys “from all users who have tested positive, and dis-
tributes them to all the user clients that are participating
in exposure notification”. Bob then periodically receives
sets of TEK keys coming from many people tested positive
to COVID-19, he re-generates all the RPIs and checks if
some of them are present in his own local storage. If some
of the keys are present in his storage, he was possibly sub-
ject to contagion.
The rationale of PPCT seems to be following:
• minimize the energy consumption. Since users are
expected to constantly run this system, it should not
severely impact battery use.
• minimize the amount of exchanged information be-
tween Alice and Bob. There is no unicast communi-
cation happening or packets handshake. This makes
power consumption predictable as it does not depend
on the number of devices nearby.
• minimize the amount of information transmitted to
Eve.
• provide to Bob a sufficient amount of information to
estimate his exposure to some infected person with-
out revealing who these people were.
Note that Apple and Google do not take responsibility
for deciding when to notify Bob, the task of passing from
Proximity Detection to the definition of Close Contact is
completely delegated to the app.
4.2. Privacy of PPCT
PPCT seems to be aligned with the privacy guidelines
from the EU. In this regard it is worth mentioning the no-
table work done by the DP-3T consortium, a group of in-
ternational experts that are devising distributed, privacy-
aware solutions for contact tracing. In a white paper they
describe three solutions, two distributed ones and a cen-
tralized one, and analyze their privacy characteristics [15].
One of the distributed solution is very close to the PPCT
proposal and their analysis basically confirms that PPCT
can be used minimizing the risk of privacy breach.
A part of their analysis that is useful to this discus-
sion is the possibility of de-anonymising the identity of
infected people among close contacts, which is considered
likely. In general when Alice is tested positive, if Bob and
Alice spent time in proximity, Bob should receive enough
information to know that there was a close contact with
an infected person, but not enough to understand who this
person was. In practice this is impossible to achieve with
a decentralized solution. Bob will receive all the RPIs Al-
ice generated and he can associate to each RPI a short
time-interval in which he was in proximity of an infected
person. If the contact lasted for a long enough time there
are chances that Bob may infer that Alice was, for in-
stance, the person that was sitting next to him in the
office for all the covered period. There is a clear trade-
off between having rolling identifiers that last long enough
to allow a precise proximity detection and short enough
not to uniquely identify a mobile phone for a long time
interval.
It interesting to note that a centralized solution may
instead elaborate all the contacts in the server and then
notify Bob that he was close to an infected person for
a certain amount of time, without Bob being necessarily
able to track the contact intervals. On the other hand
a centralized solution introduces several other potential
sources of loss of privacy reviewed in the DP-3T white
paper which we do not cover.
5. Proximity Detection with BLE: State of the Art
In this section we review the works in the literature
that deal with proximity detection using BLE on mobile
phones. There is a large body of literature in this field
which we tried to restrict to those works that provide in-
sights on the applicability of BLE contact tracing for the
COVID-19 use case. The necessary criteria are:
1. The work must present a real implementation.
2. The experimentation must involve COTS mobile de-
vices, and not only custom devices.
3. Proximity detection should be performed without ex-
ternal aids if not for results validation. This excludes
fixed BLE anchors or implicit constraints due to the
set-up of the experiment (e.g., the experiment takes
place in a single room only).
4. The proposal must be compatible with PPCT: it
must use BLE, it should not require post-processing
of data by a centralized entity and should not require
handshakes between devices.
Unfortunately, none of the works in the literature were
satisfying these criteria. We decided to list and comment
the ones that describe experiments that are as close as
possible to the use case of contact tracing for COVID-
19, in order to assess what are the main challenges for
a real contact tracing app. We split contact tracing in
two separate functions. The first is the estimation of the
distance between two devices using RSS of BLE beacons.
We see that this is already a non-trivial task. The second
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is to define when a “contact” is happening, which implies
to elaborate the data provided by the first function and
estimate reciprocity of the contact, length and duration.
5.1. Estimating Distance with BLE
Indoor positioning is, itself, an extremely popular re-
search topic which can be obtained with a variety of tech-
niques, such as triangulation or fingerprinting. Most of
these techniques rely on the presence of static beacons and
can not be adopted for contact tracing (see Gu et al. for
a recent review of this topic [16]). PPCT uses RSS with
BLE and thus it is important to shed some light on its
accuracy, even only in controlled environments. Several
papers [17, 18] perform an analysis of the accuracy of a
BLE-based positioning system when using mobile phones
as receivers and fixed, dedicated devices as broadcaster.
The measurement report that the RSS measured on the
smartphones is extremely noisy, for two reasons. The first
is multipath fading, the second is that BLE broadcasts
beacons on three different Bluetooth channels and the re-
sponse of the smartphones radio in the three channels is
different, which provides a very noisy figure when the lev-
els are summed into a single value. When people walk
there can be drops in the measured RSS up to 30 dB [17].
Katevas et al. [13] performed detailed experiments to
estimate the accuracy of distance estimation with BLE in a
very controlled environment, including an anechoic cham-
ber. The results show that distance estimation on com-
mercial devices (iPhone 5S and 6S) are very noisy, with
en error that reaches 1.5 meters on an estimation of 3 me-
ters. Similar measures are performed also by Montanari
[14], and the interesting observation that the author him-
self does is that the RSS value is completely different from
the results of Katevas et al. This is not surprising as dif-
ferent devices use different radio chips and antennas, but
underlines that even for “simple” distance estimation in
a controlled environment (one single device transmitting,
extremely low noise environment), a training phase is nec-
essary for each specific receiver. Given the extremely large
number of smartphone models in the market, it is unlikely
that a single application could show the same performance
on any mobile phone out of the box, and it is unclear how
the ground truth for training may be provided to the app.
5.2. “Contact Tracing” with BLE
Montanari et al. [19, 14] use BLE to perform contact
tracing in an office environment, with a set-up that is the
most similar to a real world situation. The goal of the
experiment was to track interactions among 25 co-workers
in an office for 4 weeks, data were validated by human ob-
servers in the office and stationary beacons. The ground
truth consisted in 401 observed interactions, meaning two
or more people standing at less than 3 meters from each
other and having a conversation. On average the interac-
tions lasted for 1 minute and 13 seconds and 70% of the
interactions were shorter than 1 minute, while only 5%
were longer than 5 minutes. The authors use a custom de-
vice in order to achieve a high precision in data collection,
but they then re-sample data in order to match the con-
figuration that is achievable on commercial devices. Some
of the results are encouraging, with realistic configurations
that could achieve between 81% and 96% true positive de-
tection rate.
Unfortunately the experiment set-up is far from the
the COVID-19 use case as it breaks all the criteria we de-
fined. Devices were smart watches and not smartphones,
this makes a big difference because watches are always at
people’s wrist and can not simply be left on a desk. With
smart watches there are higher chances that the two de-
vices are in line of sight, while a smartphone usually stays
in a pocket or bag, and RSS strongly depends on shadow-
ing and multipath fading. The choice of the parameters
allowed a much more fine-grained sensing than PPCT, as
Scan Interval and Scan Window were set to be below 5 sec-
onds, orders of magnitude lower than PPCT. The testing
environment was a firm office and only that office, partici-
pants were asked to remove watches when going out of the
office. Each contact was tracked using the RSS measured
on both watches in order to mitigate the effects of mul-
tipath fading. To achieve this, all data were stored in a
server and later on post-processed. Post processing used
machine learning to identify contacts, with a supervised
learning approach. All these issues make the set-up not at
all comparable with the COVID-19 use case, and makes it
impossible to generalize the results.
Another work that is relevant for our analysis is from
Girolami et. al. [20] and investigates the possibility of
using smartphones for contact tracing. In this case the ex-
periment included students from a high-school that were
asked to perform certain interactions (such as standing or
sitting in front of each other for 3 minutes) while their
mobile was recording BLE messages. The reported accu-
racy of encounter detection reached almost 82%. Unfortu-
nately, again the testing conditions were not comparable
to the COVID-19 use case. Interactions were not sponta-
neous, the participants were asked to perform specific ac-
tions, and these actions were happening in certain places,
not “in the wild”. The whole data-set was collected and
post-processed, the reported accuracy was obtained with
the best combination of tracking parameters and consid-
ering received beacons on both the mobiles involved in the
contact. A key contribution to this discussion from Giro-
lami’s work is contained in this sentence: Firstly, we inves-
tigate the possibility of using commercial smartphones to
advertise and to collect BLE beacons demonstrating that,
currently, such approach is not feasible due to the het-
erogeneous implementation of BLE firmware in different
versions of mobile OS (both Android and iOS). The au-
thors initially tried to use the devices of the students but
found out that in the batch of Android devices owned by
the participants (which matched 15 different models), 42%
of them were not usable for contact tracing. Even if the
hardware and the software were supposed to be compatible
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with BLE, the device simply did not allow BLE to be used
for active beaconing. In the end, the authors used mobile
phones as observers but had to equip participants with
a BLE watch acting as the broadcaster. Even once the
broadcaster was set to be a “standard” watch with fixed
hardware and software features, and the receiver phone
was kept in a pre-defined position (front pocket or back
pocket in participant’s pants), the measured RSS changed
substantially depending on the mobile phone receiving the
data and its position. Furthermore, the median number
of lost beacons per session was larger than 50%, which
suggests that in a real world scenario the loss of beacons
is an extremely important factor, which can be mitigated
only with a large Scan Window. Montanari et. al showed
that enlarging the Scan Window is the highest source of
power consumption and that the most aggressive device
configurations were depleting the device battery below a
threshold of acceptability (one day of use). The trade-off
between battery consumption and accuracy is completely
unexplored in a noisy use-case, in which people may find
themselves in crowded places with tens of other mobiles
in the range of a few meters (a bus, a shopping center,
or even only the queue to get into a shopping center). In
those cases the loss of packets due to noise and collisions
could introduce false negatives, i.e., contacts that are not
traced.
Katevas et al. in a recent paper [21] use iPhones to de-
tect interactions between couples and groups of people. 22
people were involved in a 45 minutes experiment in which
they were left in an open space and were free to socialize.
The ground truth was obtained with post-processing of
video recording. A total of 99 one-to-one encounters and
22 group encounters were detected. Again, the accuracy of
encounter detection was satisfactory (about 89%) but the
experiment set-up does not generalize to the COVID-19
use case, for similar reasons to the previous works. The
experiment was in a controlled environment, the partici-
pants had a dedicated beaconing device in one pocket and
an iPhone in the other, all data were stored and post-
processed with machine learning techniques. Furthermore
the iPhone had access to data produced by other sensors:
acceleration, gravity, rotation time.
It is important to note that as of today all the exper-
iments involving iPhones used a second dedicated device
playing the role of the broadcaster. This is due to the fact
that iOS does not allow an app to act as a broadcaster
if the app is not in the foreground. This was noted in
the literature [13] and was brought to the attention of the
media recently7. This is a privacy-preserving feature that
Apple introduced to prevent the exact goal of contact trac-
ing apps: constantly tracking the user position. Even if it
is likely that Apple could remove this limitation for the
COVID-19 use case, there are currently no scientific works
that estimate the efficacy of proximity detection using an
iPhone as a broadcaster for prolonged periods.
7See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-20/france-says-apple-s-bluetooth-policy-is-blocking-virus-tracker.
Palaghias et al. [22] present an accurate technique to
perform proximity detection using smartphones only. The
authors start from the observation that proximity detec-
tion using RSS only is not precise enough and elaborate a
new strategy that needs 6 Bluetooth packets to correctly
estimate user proximity. Results show an accuracy close
to 82% in a realistic scenario but again the technique can
not be generalized to the COVID-19 use case. Detection
is done on-line by each phone (which is a peculiarity com-
pared to other experiments which perform off-line central-
ized detection) but still with a machine learning approach
which requires training. Furthermore, proximity is esti-
mated using an estimation of the direction the user is fac-
ing based on a previously introduced technique [23] which
requires access to various sensors on the phone. This tech-
nique also includes an interaction between the two phones
using Bluetooth in ad hoc mode and the experimental set-
up is limited to 8 people performing partly controlled op-
erations in an indoor setting. It is also not clear what
version of Bluetooth is used in the experiment, and thus,
what is the effective power consumption of the proposed
technique.
6. Discussion
The first important consideration that emerges from
our analysis is that, albeit called with the same name,
the “contact tracing” that is needed to limit the spread
of a virus is not what a mobile application can provide.
A “close contact” for international guidelines is when two
people stay at a distance of less than 1-2 meters without
proper protections. A smartphone app can only estimate
when two devices are in communication range, regardless
of where their owners are and what there is in between
(a thin wall, a glass. . . ), which is generally referred to as
proximity detection. The second fundamental considera-
tion is that improving contact tracing requires high pre-
cision. The reproductive number when containment mea-
sures are in place is of a few units, and the majority of the
contacts are extremely predictable (family, workplace, hos-
pital). Proximity detection should provide an estimate of,
in average, less than one contact per infected person. The
third important consideration is that a high rate of false
positives could defeat the goal of the app itself (with peo-
ple ignoring the messages they receive) or even be harmful
(diverting precious resources to manage false positives).
Proximity detection to be reasonably useful should pro-
vide only a very short list of people that had long-lasting
contacts (more than 15 minutes) with Alice. Yet we know
that the rolling identifiers change approximately every 10
minutes, and sensing can happen at most three times in
this time span. After 10 minutes Alice’s identifier changes
and Bob’s phone is not able to keep tracking Alice’s phone.
Thus, Bob’s phone should make a precise estimate of the
proximity with a very small number of samples (at most
the samples collected in three Scan Windows). The litera-
ture analysis we performed shows that at the time being,
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there is no scientific evidence to support that under these
conditions, a proximity detection application running on
smartphones can provide such high precision.
All the works we reviewed provide reasonable accuracy
for proximity detection (between 80%-90%) but use a set-
up that is far from being applicable to the COVID-19 use
case, combining at least two of the following requirements:
• They require a centralized system to store all the
raw data. Note that this database is not limited to
detected contacts, but is needed in order to detect
contacts and should contain the RSS for all received
packets.
• They require training. Calibration of the system
needs ground truth provided by the experimenters,
and a controlled environment.
• They used dedicated devices. They were not able to
perform the experiments with smartphones only and
used custom devices that participants were wearing.
• They required direct communications between the
two phones, or access to other sources of data.
This makes it impossible to forecast the accuracy of
proximity detection when used “in the wild”.
Note that the first two requirements basically call for
a centralized system that collects every single received
packet and performs contact tracing in the server. This
is even more privacy intrusive than what is normally de-
scribed as a “centralized system” for contact tracing for
COVID-19 [15], which generally refers to a system that
collects all the proximity events after they were detected
in the phones. According to the analyzed literature in-
stead, contact tracing performed by only one mobile phone
is strongly affected by multipath fading and shadowing,
and data from the two endpoints are needed to improve
the detection. This creates a centralized system that col-
lects all the received packets (tens per second!) and owns
enough information to de-anonymise the position of the
users, their loose interactions, and in general goes defi-
nitely beyond the goals of contact tracing for COVID-19.
6.1. False Positives and Sensitivity
Let us call N the average number of close contacts
that a person may have during the observation period.
This depends on two factors, the length of the period and
the kind of social interactions this person has. Consider
a person that goes to work every day with public trans-
portation (bus), it is reasonable that he/she will stay in
the bus for more than 10 minutes, and repeat this routine
twice a day. If a distance of 2 m is maintained between
people in the bus, and we consider only the closest 2 per-
sons to be in communication range, we may estimate 4
contacts per day. We set the observation period to three
days, that is, one day that passes from the emergence of
the symptoms to when the person is tested positive (a very
optimistic estimation) and two days in advance (again, a
very conservative choice). This yields N = 12. The num-
bers we introduced in section 2.2 tell that we are looking
in average for 1 person every 3 infected people. If the app
has full penetration in the whole society and works per-
fectly, then we have that every 3∗12 = 36 traced contacts,
there is only one person that is likely positive. That is,
the task of contact tracing itself, under the assumptions
of a perfect application produces 35 false positives every
true positive. This figure does not consider several other
causes of contacts (people that work in contact with the
general public, social gatherings, shopping malls etc.) yet,
it already shows that using an app for contact tracing may
produce an unbearable amount of people that want to be
tested, or that simply ignore the messages they receive.
In order to estimate the potential efficacy of the ap-
plication, we have to take into account the adoption rate.
According to the Pew Research Center8 in Italy in 2018
71% of the population owned a smartphone, while recent
statistics9 say that Android and iOS cover almost 100%
of the market of new devices with Android alone covering
86% of the market. We know that at the time of writing,
Apple iOS does not allow active beaconing for applica-
tions that run in the background, and one of the work
observed that 42% of the Android smartphones did not
allow beaconing even if the phone specifications theoreti-
cally allowed it [20]. Assuming iOS will enable beaconing
on all devices and that sa = 1 − 0.42 = 0.58 is still a
valid estimation of the fraction of BLE-equipped Android
devices that support beaconing, we have that the fraction
of Italians that have software support for PPCT in their
phone is given by e = (0.14 + 0.86 ∗ sa) ∗ 0.71 = 0.45.
It is hard to estimate the fraction a of phones that will
be effectively able to use PPCT. There could be many rea-
sons to be excluded: non BLE-enabled phone (recall that
BLE is expected to reach all new phones on the market
only in 2024), phones owned by people not willing to in-
stall the app, that failed to install the app, or that are not
allowed to install the app (because their phone is provided
by their employer). Then we should consider phones that
are simply discharged, or impossible to use (carried in a
bag that isolates BLE transmissions). We may use a pru-
dent value a = 0.5 which produces a fraction of devices in
condition to use PPCT corresponding to E = e∗a = 0.225.
These phones are in conditions or receiving beacons,
similar to the ones tested in the papers in the literature.
Let us assume that the app never introduces false positives
(an extremely strong assumption) and that it is able to
detect A = 81% of the proximity events, the lower bound
of the results reported by the literature in non realistic
conditions. Then the sensitivity of the contact tracing
8See Spring 2018 Global Attitude Survey
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-always-equally/.
9See the data from IDC.com including the cur-
rent and past market shares of new smartphones
https://www.idc.com/promo/smartphone-market-share/os.
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application (i.e. the number of contacts that are correctly
traced divided by N) is given by S = E ∗ A ≃ 0.18. That
is, the application will be able to provide less than one
fifth of the possible contacts.
7. The Way Ahead
In the short term with current technologies, we argue
that the high number of potential false positives and the
low sensitivity does not justify the introduction of a con-
tact tracing application with an extremely high potential
privacy risk. Yet, several apps are currently under develop-
ment and will be released soon10. In this section we build
on the previous discussion to provide some pragmatic con-
siderations on how to make the best use of digital contact
tracing.
As a first point, we stress the importance of a rigorous
monitoring of the ongoing efforts to produce contact trac-
ing applications. It is essential that not only the source
code of the apps, but also the results on their experi-
mentation and their daily use is made available for public
scrutiny. Since we outlined important technical unsolved
challenges it is paramount that the way these challenges
are addressed is made public, so that experts can evalu-
ate the efficacy of the app, and validate the efficacy of the
approach. It is also fundamental that the results obtained
with the app will be constantly monitored during its use,
to periodically asses its overall social utility. If the app
may reveal to be inefficient, there are still other ways we
could reshape its goals to provide some social benefit.
7.1. From Contact Tracing to Risk Profiles
The amount of contacts with infected people and their
cumulative duration, even if coming from a noisy source of
information may provide users with an estimation of their
cumulative exposure to risk. This may be beneficial in
convincing them to adopt protection measures, keep the
safety distance or change some of their habits in order
to see their risk profile improve. Such protection mea-
sures are a limitation of freedom, and certain categories
of people that are less exposed to the risk may not be
motivated enough to enforce them. Creating empathy to-
wards the others is key to motivate people in respecting
social distancing [24], and in this sense gamification is an
approach that has been proved useful in several domains,
including health [25] and may be adopted also in this spe-
cific situation. Gamification means introducing game ele-
ments in non-gaming activities and can encourage people
to reach goals quickly. Gamification goes beyond “points
and badges” and can be used for the creation of social
awareness of the consequences or one’s own actions to-
wards the more vulnerable ones, which is an effective way
10We just mention the Italian and Swiss ones,
available at https://github.com/immuni-app and
https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-ios-ch respectively.
of motivating people to respect contention measures [26].
The amount of information required for this task could be
lower than what required for contact tracing thus lowering
the privacy risk. For instance, re-use or RPIs could make
it harder to de-anonymize the identity of infected contacts,
while still providing a reasonable measure of the exposure
risk.
7.2. Assisted Analog Contact Tracing
One of the key challenges of analog contact tracing is
that Alice needs to be interviewed by an expert that is
able to identify the contacts that are at risk, based on
the kind of exposure. This is a time-consuming task, and
people can not always remember all their contacts. On
the other hand we know that digital contact tracing can
not be used automatically, as it only identifies proximity.
Merging the two forms of tracing would instead definitely
improve contact identification. If the expert can access a
list of contacts which can be reviewed together with the
infected person, the whole process would be made faster
and more robust. Unfortunately this is not achievable with
the current solution, due to the privacy requirements we
(rightly) set on the application.
With more time and research efforts, it may be pos-
sible to achieve a satisfactory trade-off that follows this
direction.
8. Conclusions
The risk assessment of a proximity tracing app, con-
sidering its privacy issues it is very hard to do, since the
fallout of data leakage can be simply impossible to predict
with current information. For this reason, a first principle
approach would call to ask, before even proposing it, what
is the estimated benefit of an application that introduces
a potential privacy risk. We analyzed the available litera-
ture to try to answer this question, matching the data of
the pandemic with the available data from experiments in
proximity tracing, and our conclusion is that there is not
enough evidence to support that such an app would help
slow down the running contagion.
A contact tracing app, adopting the highest standards
of privacy could be indeed useful to spread awareness and
encourage modifications in people behavior, a goal that
appears to be less daunting and more practical to achieve
in the short term.
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Appendix A. Excerpts from Relevant Documents
Appendix A.1. Definition of Close Contacts from National
Health Institutes
Here we report a number of definitions of “close con-
tact” from the official documents of several English speak-
ing national health institutions. Note that most of these
document extend the definition with specific provisions for,
i.e., households or partners, which we don’t report here as
they are easy to detect without the need of a mobile phone
app. The definitions may also change with time, as more
evidence is accumulated on the way the virus spreads.
The US Center for Desease and Control Prevention
identifies a close contact as Individual who has had close
contact (< 6 feet) for a prolonged period of time and spec-
ifies in notes that11:
Factors to consider when defining close contact include
proximity, the duration of exposure (e.g., longer exposure
time likely increases exposure risk), whether the individ-
ual has symptoms (e.g., coughing likely increases exposure
risk) and whether the individual was wearing a facemask
(which can efficiently block respiratory secretions from con-
taminating others and the environment).
Data are insufficient to precisely define the duration
of time that constitutes a prolonged exposure. Recommen-
dations vary on the length of time of exposure from 10
minutes or more to 30 minutes or more. [. . . ] Brief inter-
actions are less likely to result in transmission; however,
11See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/public-health-recommendations.html
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symptoms and the type of interaction (e.g., did the per-
son cough directly into the face of the individual) remain
important.
According to the Australian guidelines a close contact
is a “face-to-face contact in any setting with a confirmed
or probable case, for greater than 15 minutes cumulative
over the course of a week [. . . ] sharing of a closed space
with a confirmed or probable case for a prolonged period
(e.g. more than 2 hours) in the period extending from
48 hours before onset of symptoms in the confirmed or
probable case”12.
For the Irish Health institution a close contact is de-
fined as Any individual who has had greater than 15 min-
utes face-to-face (<2 meters distance) contact with a case,
in any setting.13
The state of Alberta (CA) provides the following def-
inition: individuals that lived with or otherwise had close
prolonged contact (i.e., for more than 15 min and within
two metres) with a case without consistent and appropri-
ate use of PPE [Personal Protection Equipment] and not
isolating14
Appendix A.2. EU Privacy Guidelines
The the mentioned EU Privacy Guidelines [12] contain
the following guidelines:
The systematic and large scale monitoring of location
and/or contacts between natural persons is a grave intru-
sion into their privacy. It can only be legitimised by relying
on a voluntary adoption by the users for each of the respec-
tive purposes. This would imply, in particular, that indi-
viduals who decide not to or cannot use such applications
should not suffer from any disadvantage at all.
[. . . ] contact tracing apps do not require tracking the
location of individual users. Instead, proximity data should
be used; as contact tracing applications can function with-
out direct identification of individuals,appropriate measures
should be put in place to prevent re-identification; the col-
lected information should reside on the terminal equipment
of the user and only the relevant information should be col-
lected when absolutely necessary.
[. . . ] procedures and processes including respective al-
gorithms implemented by the contact tracing apps should
work under the strict supervision of qualified personnel in
order to limit the occurrence of any false positives and neg-
atives. In particular, the task of providing advice on next
steps should not be based solely on automated processing.
False positives will always occur to a certain degree. As
the identification of an infection risk probably can have a
high impact on individuals, such as remaining in self isola-
tion until tested negative, the ability to correct data and/or
subsequent analysis results is a necessity. This, of course,
should only apply to scenarios and implementations where
12See https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/cdna-song-novel-coronavirus.htm
13https://www.hpsc.ie/a-z/respiratory/coronavirus/novelcoronavirus/guidance/contacttracingguidance/National%20Interim%20Guidance%20for%20contact%20tracing.pdf
14See https://open.alberta.ca/publications/coronavirus-covid-19
data is processed and/or stored in a way where such cor-
rection is technically feasible and where the adverse effects
mentioned above are likely to happen.
Any server involved in the contact tracing system must
only collect the contact history or the pseudonymous iden-
tifiers of a user diagnosed as infected as the result of a
proper assessment made by health authorities and of a vol-
untary action of the user. Alternately, the server must
keep a list of pseudonymous identifiers of infected users
or their contact history only for the time to inform poten-
tially infected users of their exposure, and should not try
to identify potentially infected users.
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